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   ABSTRACT
What constitutes a good life? A hedonist’s 
answer to this question is rather simple—
more pleasure, less pain. While hedonism 
was previously a widely accepted belief, it 
now suffers from several crucial objections. 
A challenge particularly vexing to hedonists 
is the Philosophy of Swine: could it be 
possible that our lives may be less than 
that of a theoretical swine? In this essay, 
I argue that lifetime hedonism, the view 
of hedonism concerned with one’s total 
lifelong well-being, does not survive this 
objection. In particular, I will refute the 
counterarguments that modern-day 
hedonist, Ben Bramble, presents against the 
Philosophy of Swine objection.
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I. INTRODUCTION
What constitutes a good life? What does it mean to live well? A 
hedonist’s answer to these questions is rather simple: more pleasure, less 
pain. While hedonism was widely accepted by philosophers in the past, 
arguably dating back to Plato, it has now few advocates as it suffers from 
several objections.1 A challenge that is particularly vexing to hedonists 
is the Philosophy of Swine: could it be possible that the life one lives is 
less than that of a theoretical swine?
Rather than biting the bullet and saying that may well be, modern-
day hedonist Ben Bramble argues that this is impossible.2 I briefly 
summarize Bramble’s view of hedonism, the Philosophy of Swine 
objection, and Bramble’s response. Then, I refute each of his claims 
to disprove lifetime hedonism, ultimately showing how a lifetime 
hedonism cannot escape from the Philosophy of Swine problem. 
II. BRAMBLE’S ACCOUNT OF HEDONISM
Bramble defines hedonism as the idea that pleasure and pain just 
consist in determining one’s lifetime well-being, which is the view 
that evaluates the pleasures and pains experienced by an individual 
throughout their life as a whole. He claims that lifetime well-being 
holds greater normative significance than momentary well-being.3 He 
then explains his model of hedonism, Hedonism about Benefiting and 
Harming (hereby HBH)—the idea that benefiting and harming consist 
in affecting pleasures and pains in various ways, where benefiting or 
harming someone is to make their lives better or worse off in respect 
to their life as a whole. The motivation and basis for HBH is the 
Experience Requirement, which Bramble takes for granted. This 
requirement states that for something to benefit or harm a person, it 
must affect that person’s experience phenomenologically.4
He then introduces two main branches of hedonism: the felt-
quality theory, which he believes in, and the attitude-based theory. 
The felt-quality theory, also known as phenomenalism, is the theory 
that pleasure or pain is a mental state or property that is or has a certain 
phenomenology—that is, a subject’s experience. On the contrary, 
the attitude-based theory, or intentionalism, states that pleasure and 
pain are intended phenomenologies. Bramble rejects the attitude-
1 Roger Crisp, “Well-Being,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 
Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/
entries/well-being/.
2 Ben Bramble, “A New Defense of Hedonism about Well-Being,” Ergo: 
An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3, no. 4 (2016): 85-86, 10.3998/
ergo.12405314.0003.004.
3 Bramble, “Hedonism,” 85-86.
4 Bramble, “Hedonism,” 88.
based theory, as he writes that the intentionalist would also have to 
accept that one’s pleasures and pains could change if there is a change 
in one’s intention to maintain their current phenomenology. Even if 
this intention could be considered a separate phenomenology on its 
own, it would have to be connected to the phenomenology it resulted 
in. To suggest such a connection between distinct phenomenologies, 
then, would indicate a certain shared phenomenology among all 
phenomenologies that allows them to be interpreted as pleasurable or 
painful.5
However, this does not seem to be necessarily true. For instance, 
one may abandon lifetime hedonism in favor of the momentary well-
being view of hedonism. Instead, one can claim that all pleasures 
do not share a common qualitative characteristic that allows for the 
evaluation of lifetime pleasures and pains as wholes. A momentary-
intentiontionalist’s view, then, could be phrased as such: intent 
phenomenology A could have a common phenomenology with its 
resulting phenomenology A’ but not necessarily with a different intent 
phenomenology B nor its resulting phenomenology B’. 
III. THE PHILOSOPHY OF SWINE
In Pleasure and the Good Life, Fred Feldman describes Porky’s case, a 
human being who lives in a pigsty and pleasures greatly from engaging 
in sexual activities with the pigs. He has no other sources of pleasure, 
such as human relationships or learning, and has never experienced pain 
in his life.6 The threat that the Philosophy of Swine objection poses to 
hedonism, reformulated by Bramble, is:
1. Hedonism entails that Porky’s life could be as high in well-
being as the life of a normal human being.
2. Porky’s life could not be as high in well-being as the life of a 
normal human being.
3. Therefore, hedonism is false.7
IV. BRAMBLE’S RESPONSE
There are two ways a hedonist could defend hedonism against the 
Philosophy of Swine objection: by either denying the second premise—
that is, to bite the bullet and admit that Porky is as well off as a normal 
human being—or the first premise, claiming that hedonism does not 
entail that Porky is as well off as a normal human being.
5 Bramble, “Hedonism,” 90-94.
6 Fred Feldman, Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature Varieties and 
Plausibility of Hedonism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 40-41, 
10.1093/019926516X.001.0001.
7 Bramble, “Hedonism,” 95.
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In response to the Philosophy of Swine objection, Bramble takes 
the second approach and presents what he considers a “better response” 
than biting the bullet: 
1. Porky’s pleasures are not as especially pleasurable as the 
pleasures of a normal human.
2. Porky’s pleasures are not as diverse as the pleasures of a normal 
human.
3. Hedonism does not entail that Porky’s life could be as high in 
well-being as the life of a normal human being, as his pleasures 
are lacking in these two aspects.8
Against the first premise, Bramble argues that a pleasure is not 
especially pleasurable if it is easy to attend to. A pleasure is easy to 
attend to if it (1) pertains to a certain bodily location rather than 
permeating one’s experiential field, such as the pleasures of orgasms or 
massages, (2) comes suddenly rather than building up slowly over time, 
or (3) involves little to no mental absorption in a certain pleasurable 
activity or thing. Pleasures derived from, say, sex or drugs are not as 
pleasurable as they fulfill all three criteria. He explains why pleasures 
that are not easy to attend to, such as those of learning or aesthetic 
appreciation, are more pleasurable as he quotes Henry Sidgwick; 
that is, “the genuine artist at work seems to have a predominant and 
temporarily absorbing desire for the realization of his ideal of beauty.”9 
Meanwhile, Bramble’s argument concerning the second premise is 
twofold. He argues that Porky’s pleasures are not as diverse as a normal 
human being’s because they are purely (1) repetitive and (2) physical. 
Purely repeated pleasures add nothing to one’s lifetime well-being as 
they cannot introduce anything qualitatively new to the pleasurableness 
of a person, and purely bodily pleasures offer little qualitative diversity. 
Conversely, he explains why his examples of multi-dimensional, 
non-physical pleasures, such as those of love, learning, and aesthetic 
appreciation, are qualitatively diverse. For instance, pleasures that come 
from learning are diverse in character, because people can acquire 
different information and interact with this information in various 
ways.10 
He then proceeds to argue against Chris Heathwood’s objection 
that Porky could have various experiences as well. For instance, what if 
Porky could engage in various sexual activities with different animals, 
never to be bored? To this concern, Bramble argues that there will still 
be a lack of qualitative distinction between his experiences. To Porky, 
8 Bramble, “Hedonism,” 96.
9 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (London: Macmillan and Co., 1913), 49.
10 Bramble, “Hedonism,” 98.
having sex with pig A would not be too different from having sex with 
pig B, or even cow C, for he cannot experience love, which is a more 
diverse pleasure.11
Bramble also refutes the claim that at least some purely repeated 
pleasures can contribute to one’s well-being. In response to this 
concern, he first claims that most of the pleasures that seem to be 
purely repeated still introduce new elements. For example, the pleasure 
of drinking coffee may seem one-dimensional but can be diversified 
by introducing other factors such as where or with whom one drinks 
the coffee. In addition, he also states that even pleasures that are purely 
repeated can have instrumental values and act as a sort of “oil for our 
joints” that fill in the gaps between impactful pleasures.12 
V. IMMEDIACY OF PORKY’S PLEASURES
As in his first argument, I do not intend to argue with the criteria 
Bramble sets for easily accessible pleasures. Rather, I will show why his 
claim, that such pleasures are not as pleasurable, contradicts his version 
of phenomenalism, which he calls the felt-quality theory of hedonism. 
Phenomenalists claim that we desire pleasures because they feel good; 
they are pleasurable. If slowly-building pleasures truly provide higher 
levels of pleasure, it would be more likely for one to have higher desire 
for such pleasures. But this does not seem to be the case. In fact, it 
is more common for immediate pleasures, such as sex or drugs, to 
have this effect. How is it that people often display higher desires for 
immediate pleasures if they are less pleasurable than slowly-building 
pleasures?
There are two possible counterarguments that Bramble could 
provide to this claim. The first is to say that more people desire slowly-
building pleasures than those who desire immediate ones; since more 
people desire it, the appeals of such pleasures are greater. However, I 
believe that it is faulty to directly attribute the widespread preference 
of slowly-building pleasures to their appeal, as other factors also come 
into play. For instance, those who do not desire immediate pleasures 
are often not fully aware of the phenomenology that they provide or 
are affected by sociocultural factors such as stigmas against sources of 
instant pleasures. Yet, many of those who have experienced immediate 
pleasures desire them greatly despite these negative sociocultural 
factors, which shows the strong appeal of such pleasures. Moreover, 
those who have already experienced immediate pleasures still desire to 
experience them again. An apparent type of expression of such desires 
are withdrawal symptoms. The desires are not gone, but are merely 
11 Bramble, “Hedonism,” 99.
12 Bramble, “Hedonism,” 100.
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repressed within the individual due to factors such as social stigma or 
health issues.
Another potential counterargument Bramble could give is that the 
addictiveness of quick pleasures comes from their immediateness, not 
their level of pleasure. Their appeal could be that they are low-quality 
but cheap and accessible. However, this argument begs the question as 
it is already based on the assumption that immediate pleasures are not 
as pleasurable, for which he does not provide sufficient reasoning. For 
Bramble, in order to accuse quick pleasures of being “low in quality,” 
he would first have to define the factors that account for such low levels 
of pleasure that they provide. 
VI. DIVERSITY OF PORKY’S PLEASURES: REPETITIVENESS
To refute Bramble’s second argument, I could either state that 
Porky’s pleasures are not purely repetitive and physical, or that purely 
repetitive pleasures can add to one’s lifetime well-being and that bodily 
pleasures can be qualitatively diverse. I take the latter approach.
Bramble does not provide convincing evidence as to why purely 
repeated pleasures cannot affect one’s lifetime well-being. Earlier in 
his paper, Bramble establishes his model of hedonism, HBH, which 
accounts for minimal hedonism—the full determination of one’s well-
being by pleasures and pains. However, there is nothing inherent in 
pleasures and pains that explain why only new pleasures and pain can 
affect one’s well-being. In his rebuttal against Bramble, “Is pleasure 
all that is good about experience?,” Willem van der Deijl words this 
concern perfectly: “if only pleasure and pain matter intrinsically, why 
would then only some pleasure and pain matter?”13
Bramble could argue that purely repetitive pleasures gradually 
decrease over time as the level of attention paid to an object, event, or 
person decreases due to familiarity. Consider the life of a human who 
lives for about an average of eighty years. If Porky’s life were extended 
to the point where the average cumulative pleasure felt in his life 
trumps that experienced in a human’s life, Bramble may then argue 
that Porky’s repeated pleasures would eventually arrive at zero, not 
gaining any pleasure from the same activity, provided the decreasing 
trend in pleasure levels were to continue. However, he would then have 
to explain the nature of habit; even though humans do get bored of a 
repeated activity, there are activities that humans rely on as a consistent 
source of pleasure. Even if we may not recognize as much pleasure from 
drinking water compared to drinking a new juice, there is still some 
13 Willem van der Deijl, “Is Pleasure All that is Good about Experience?,” 
Philosophical Studies 176, no. 7 (2019): 1781, 10.1007/s11098-018-1090-y.
consistent pleasure that one derives from their thirst being quenched. 
The challenge that Porky presents, then, still remains: after a certain 
amount of time Porky outlives a human, would he eventually be 
happier than all of us?14
Let us now return to Bramble’s rebuttal against the 
counterargument that some purely repeated pleasures can add to one’s 
well-being. His first claim that most purely repeated pleasures seem to 
subtly introduce new elements is irrelevant to the discussion of Deijl’s 
problem; it only rules out seemingly repetitive pleasures. Rather, what 
matters is his second argument that purely repetitive pleasures are 
not significant to one’s well-being, but can have instrumental values. 
In explaining his definition of instrumental values, he writes that, 
“[repetitive] pleasures can relax or stimulate us. They can rejuvenate 
or sustain us.”15 How are these pleasures, then, any different from 
non-repetitive pleasures? Are relaxation and stimulation not ways to 
affect one’s phenomenology? Bramble’s distinction between non-
repetitive pleasures and instrumental “filler” pleasures appears to be 
an unsuccessful attempt to avoid accepting that repeated pleasures do 
affect one’s phenomenology. If he were to accept this, he would have 
to admit that repetitive pleasures also benefit people and therefore, add 
to their lifetime well-being, according to HBH. Thus, Bramble fails to 
show why purely repeated pleasures cannot affect one’s well-being.
VII. DIVERSITY OF PORKY’S PLEASURES: BODILY 
PLEASURES
Bramble also fails to prove that purely bodily pleasures lack in 
qualitative diversity due to the sorites paradox, where the boundaries 
of a certain condition are unclear. The paradox evokes this question: 
how many types of pleasures should a source of pleasure provide to 
be considered as “qualitatively diverse?” If Porky did not have any 
diversity in his pleasures, then it would surely be impossible to deem 
them as being qualitatively diverse. However, Bramble accepts that 
“we might succeed in adding some new kinds of pleasures to [Porky’s 
life].”16 If Porky can have some variety in his pleasures, Bramble should 
be able to provide a criterion that determines a pleasure’s qualitative 
diversity to state that Porky’s purely bodily pleasures are not diverse 
enough.
A possible counterargument that Bramble could make is that a 
source of pleasure, regardless of the number of pleasures it may provide, 
requires specific qualities to be qualitatively diverse. Such qualities 
14 Crisp, “Well-Being.”
15 Bramble, “Hedonism,” 100.
16 Bramble, “Hedonism,” 99.
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may be derived from interactions with unique personal characteristics, 
aesthetic value, or a deepened understanding of the world. In this case, 
the burden again seems to be on Bramble to answer Deijl’s question: if 
only pleasure and pain matter intrinsically, why would then only some 
pleasure and pain matter in the discussion of qualitative diversity?
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have demonstrated the failure of lifetime hedonism 
against the Philosophy of Swine objection by disproving Bramble’s 
claims that Porky’s pleasures are not as pleasurable nor diverse 
compared to those of a normal human being. If he cannot prove that 
Porky’s pleasures are inferior compared to a normal human being, an 
immortal Porky would eventually be happier than all of humanity. 
It seems that the only options left for a lifetime hedonist, then, are to 
either bite the bullet and conclude that Porky is as well off as we are or 
to abandon the sinking ship that is lifetime hedonism.
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